Indian Air Force Future Fighter Aircraft: A Critique of Procuring More Rafales

An op/ed titled “Drawing borders in the air” by Air Marshal Diptendu Choudhury (Retd) in the Indian Express (July 1, 2024) sparked interest, initially evoking thoughts of Lt Gen Francis Tuker’s post-WWII vision of India’s strategic “air boundaries.” However, the piece primarily served as a pitch for acquiring more French Rafale fighter aircraft, leading to disappointment for those expecting a broader strategic discussion on the Indian Air Force Future Fighter Aircraft roadmap.

The Dassault Avions Rafale, conceived in the mid-1970s, is considered a high-end 4.5 generation combat jet, firmly rooted in 20th-century technology. India’s 2015 acquisition of 36 Rafales was, as predicted years ago, merely an initial small buy intended to pave the way for France to sell a greater number of these progressively aging aircraft to the Indian Air Force, along with the carrier-based Rafale-Marine for the Navy. Air Marshal Choudhury’s advocacy is for the purchase of an additional 114 planes for the air force. This push comes at a time when several 6th generation combat aircraft projects are underway globally—developed through costly consortia in Europe (including France) and separate initiatives like Boeing and Lockheed’s NGAD (New Generation Air Defence) programs for the US Air Force, none of which have received full Pentagon commitment. This raises a critical question: Are all manned aerial weapons platforms already obsolete?

The future of warfare is likely to be dominated by composite forces comprising long-range drone swarms operating in fused lateral communication webs (drone-to-drone, drone-to-command drone, or command pilot directing drones as “wingmen”), integrated with ballistic and cruise missiles. In such a kill chain, the human pilot is arguably already redundant. However, air forces in wealthy Western nations, and more cautiously in Russia and China, are collaborating with their aerospace industries—potentially for one final push—to indulge the fighter pilot community with 6th generation aircraft. This trend persists, as previously argued, because the US, European countries, and now China can apparently afford such endeavors. Can India? Judging by the proponents for these acquisitions within the Indian Air Force, seemingly yes.

Choudhury presented four primary justifications for procuring more Rafales for the IAF: Firstly, the perceived threat from the Chinese J-20s, which he described as “fifth generation stealth fighters” stationed at Xigatze, working in tandem with lurking J-10s to pose a threat to India. The J-10 is a Chinese derivative of the Israeli Lavi; its technology and schematics were reportedly acquired from Israel in the 1980s after the US pressured Tel Aviv to buy F-16s, forcing Israel Aerospace Industries to sell Lavi tech to Chengdu Aircraft Corporation to recoup costs. Secondly, he argued that more Rafales would help the IAF maintain an asymmetric force advantage. Thirdly, they would serve as a bridging, multirole force between the current aging fleet of Su-30s, MiG-29s, and Mirage 2000s, and the future indigenous fleet consisting of the AMCA (advanced medium combat aircraft), Tejas Mk 1A, and Tejas Mk-II, which are still a decade away from operational readiness. Lastly, he suggested it would “reduce dependence” on Russia and “prevent” reliance on a “temperamental” US.

Here are brief counterpoints:

There’s no such thing as a truly stealth aircraft. No aircraft can completely evade detection by low-frequency radar, a technology dating back to World War Two. It’s worth remembering reports from a few years ago about an Indian air station claiming to have detected a PLAAF J-20. Furthermore, the J-20 remains largely untested and unproven. The J-10, meanwhile, is a heavier, longer, and less agile version of the Lavi, primarily because Chengdu fitted it with a Russian AL-31 jet engine after being unable to access the prospective Lavi Pratt & Whitney powerplant.
Dassault Rafale future fighter aircraft in Indian Air Force liveryIndia holds no symmetric or asymmetric force advantage on the LAC that the PLAAF couldn’t quickly neutralize by deploying a large number of aircraft from mainland bases. Nevertheless, the current mix of air force fighter aircraft in the IAF fleet can manage large numbers of Chinese aircraft operating off Tibetan plateau bases for some time. This is because planes taking off from high altitudes are severely handicapped by the dilemma of optimizing fuel versus weapon load – a constraint IAF aircraft operating from the plains do not face.

As a bridging fleet, the Su-30 MKIs would offer better operational and economic value. For the cost of two Rafales armed with various missiles—Mica (air-to-air), short-range Hammer (air-to-ground), Scalp cruise (air-to-ground), and the long-range Meteor (air-to-air)—the IAF could acquire five Su-30s. Many renowned international aviation experts currently rate the Su-30MKI as one of the best air dominance fighters. Manohar Parrikar, arguably India’s most effective defence minister, was wise to favor the Su-30MKI option over the Rafale (and was subsequently moved back to Goa for his stance). These are considerations for fighter aircraft manufacturing countries vying for contracts.

Eliminating Russia and the US from the supply side of India’s aircraft procurement makes sense only if the resulting savings are directed towards the indigenous AMCA, Tejas 1A, and Mk-2 programs, rather than being transferred to France to support its aerospace sector, as the Air Marshal proposes. His suggestion that the IAF should rely on France for future aviation needs implicitly indicates a lack of confidence in the potential of the Tejas line or the AMCA. Perhaps he believes France is immune to American pressure tactics; if so, he should reconsider. (Then again, who in the IAF would want to miss out on repeated trips to Paris to negotiate additional Rafale deals?!) Understanding the list of fighter aircraft by generation highlights the shift the world is making.

Choudhury’s focus is firmly rooted in the present, showing no apparent concern for the trajectory of warfare towards Artificial Intelligence-driven autonomous weapons. While dwelling on the comfortable certainties of past manned platforms might be a pleasant pastime for retired Air Marshals, it arguably reflects the prevailing mindset at Air Headquarters and could ultimately prove detrimental to the Indian Air Force’s future readiness. For the Modi government to accept such counsel would merely reinforce the perception that, when it comes to national security, it lacks a clear understanding of future challenges.